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EXPECTATIONS AND COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION 
INSTITUTIONS 
David L. Dickinson 
Preliminary Draft 
ABSTRACT 
Arbitration is a growing method of resolving disputes in varied settings. While two 
specific arbitration rules dominate in practice, other procedures have been hypothesized to better 
promote voluntary settlement. Such hypotheses require theoretical assumptions of identical 
bargainer expectations even though divergent expectations or optimism is considered prevalent 
in naturally occurring negotiations. This article examines disputant behavior in a controlled 
laboratory setting where point-estimates of disputant expectations are captured, thus allowing 
one to test the "chilling effect" hypotheses of optimism on both dispute rates and final-offer 
divergence. The extent of the dual chilling effect is examined for both commonly used 
arbitration procedures as well as for an innovative procedure that, while not used in practice, is 
theoretically predicted to induce final-offer convergence when expectations are unbiased. The 
results show that optimism is prevalent in the data, extra information does not fully de-bias the 
disputants, and optimism increases both dispute rates and final-offer divergence. The degree to 
which a final offer plays a strategic role in the arbitration institution is an important determinant 
of this final chilling effect result. Lastly, once the effects of optimism are considered, the 
innovative arbitration procedure actually generates the highest dispute rates, contrary to its 
theoretical claim. 
EXPECTATIONS AND COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION 
INSTITUTIONS* 
1. Introduction 
Arbitration is currently used to resolve disputes in a variety of arenas. Labor disputes, 
commercial contract disputes, lemon-law disputes, environmental disputes, and securities 
industry disputes, among others, all utilize arbitration to generate binding settlements. The 
Supreme Court also ruled in 2001 that employers can require workers to arbitrate job-related 
disputes as a condition of employment, and so the impetus of the U.S. legal system is to increase 
the use of arbitration and selectively use it as a replacement for traditional litigation. 1 Two forms 
of arbitration rules dominate in practice: Conventional arbitration (CA) allows the arbitrator to 
impose any settlement on the disputants, whereas in final-offer arbitration (FaA) the arbitrator is 
constrained to choose one of the disputant's final offers as the binding settlement. Bargaining 
outcomes are likely to be affected by which arbitration institution is utilized. Additionally, 
disputant expectations playa key role in the likelihood of voluntary versus arbitrated settlements. 
Optimistic expectations about the likely outcomes generated by arbitration will lower the 
perceived "price" of arbitrated settlements and likely increase the quantity demanded of 
arbitrated settlements (i.e., the dispute rate). 
This article examines the effects of disputant expectations on distinct arbitration 
institutions. The institutional comparison is conducted in a controlled laboratory setting. 
"'The research was supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-O 133231, for which the author is 
grateful. Partial support was also provided by the Utah State University Agricultural Experiment Station. Valuable 
comments were provided by XXXXXXXXXXX. The author is grateful to Kamalakar Thota, Pablo F. Rego Barros, 
Jianlin Cheng, Lujun Zhang, and Stacie Gomm for their programming services in creating the computerized 
bargaining environment. The author also thanks Nitesh Saha for his valuable research support. 
IThe case is Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 99-1379. 
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Bargaining outcomes are examined in the context of CA, FOA, and an innovative procedure 
called "combined arbitration" (CombA). CombA is developed in Brams and Merrill (1986) and 
it combines the rules of CA and FOA in a way that produces theoretically convergent final 
offers. Basically, the rules ofFOA are used if the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement lies 
between the disputants' final offers, but CA rules are used otherwise. Though not used in 
practice, the theoretical property of convergent final offers in CombA is more attractive than the 
final offer predictions for either CA or FOA, and the laboratory offers an ideal setting to 
compare this innovative arbitration procedure with the commonly used CA and FOA procedures. 
Biased expectations of likely arbitration awards may, however, alter [mal offer and/or dispute 
rate predictions, and so a key contribution of the article is the point-estimates of disputant 
expectations that are elicited in the bargaining experiments. Such expectations estimates allow 
disputant optimism to be documented and their potentially distinct effects across arbitration 
institutions measured. Given that optimism (or self-serving bias, divergent expectations, etc.) is 
considered prevalent in many bargaining contexts, this connection between optimism and 
bargaining outcomes under different dispute resolution institutions is key to our ability to 
interpret field data on arbitration and suggest likely avenues to improve bargaining outcomes 
under increasingly used arbitration. 
The results indicate that optimism is prevalent in the data, not easily eliminated, and it 
significantly increases the probability of dispute as well as the divergence between disputants' 
[mal bargaining positions (i.e., final offers). Optimism's effect on final offers is also a function 
of the degree to which the final offers playa strategic role in the arbitration institution. When 
arbitration explicitly utilizes final offers in the decision rule, then optimism "chills" bargaining to 
a greater degree. This is important because if the arbitration rules constrain the arbitrator to 
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choose one of the disputant's final offers, then increasingly divergent final offers implies more 
divergent arbitrated outcomes, which may reduce the acceptability of the arbitration institution. 
Also, holding expectations constant, dispute rates are actually highest in CombA, perhaps 
contrary to the intuition of the convergent final offers theoretical prediction, which is a principle 
argument in support of the innovative procedure. Implications are discussed in the concluding 
section of the article. 
2. Background 
The increasing use of arbitration to resolve disputes is part of a broader move to utilize 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures, such as mediation, arbitration, and fact-finding, 
to help resolve disputes. Binding arbitration is unique in that it guarantees a settlement and so it 
is used primarily where continued impasse has been deemed unacceptable or undesirable. In 
labor disputes, for example, binding arbitration is often used as a replacement for strike rights in 
contract disputes for critical service industry workers (e.g., firefighters, policemen, etc.). Such 
disputes covering labor contract terms for large numbers of workers can involve millions of 
dollars. One needs look no farther than Major League Baseball salary disputes, which are settled 
by FOA rules, to understand that magnitude of settlement dollars handled by arbitration in just 
one isolated industry. Considering that arbitration is utilized in a very wide variety of industries 
and settings to resolve disputes, the cumulative dollars involved in a given year are significant.2 
Given that millions of dollars are allocated every year through commonly used arbitration 
procedures, a comparison of outcomes under CA and FOA is desirable. The original argument 
2Consider other more varied examples of arbitration: Arbitration was used to award "$16 million to the 
heirs of Abraham Zap ruder for the sale to the U.S. government of Zapruder's historic home movie ... " capturing the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Dispute Resolution Times). Also, President George Washington's will 
calls for arbitration of any disputes over interpretation of his will (contained in the records of Fairfax County, 
Virginia). Ashenfelter et al. (1992) also notes that the death sentence of Socrates in ancient Athens was handed 
down using a type of arbitration similar to FOA. 
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behind the creation ofFOA rules was that the constrained arbitrator decision-rule would create 
greater outcome uncertainty and reduce the so-called "chilling" effect of arbitration (see Stevens, 
1966). The theoretical research that followed showed this to not necessarily be the case as the 
obvious strategic nature of final offers in FOA lead to predictions of divergent disputant final 
offers (Farber, 1980; Crawford, 1979; Brams and Merrill, 1983). It is for this reason that 
CombA (Brams and Merrill, 1986) seems attractive. The theoretical prediction is that final 
offers converge, which seems to indicate that voluntary settlement is likely. From a theoretical 
standpoint CombA seems to be an improvement upon the incentives of CA and FOA, though 
biased expectations may confound a more pure test of their relative incentive effects. 
Empirical research comparing outcomes under distinct arbitration institutions has 
included both field research in public sector labor disputes and experimental research. There has 
been mixed results in determining whether bargaining outcomes are better in CA or FOA, and 
most of the research focuses on dispute rates as the metric for gauging the success of an 
arbitration procedure. The early field evidence indicated that dispute rates are lower in FOA 
than CA (Feuille, 1975), but it is also argued that for a given dispute rate the arbitrated 
settlements in FOA will likely be of lower quality than those in CA given that FOA awards are 
typically more extreme (Feigenbaum, 1975). More recent evidence from the public sector also 
show lower dispute rates in FOA (Hebdon, 1996). A critique offield results is that not all 
jurisdictions studied include the same rules for what may be categorized as a particular dispute 
resolution procedure. Fiegenbaum (1975) highlights how FOA rules can be quite different from 
state to state, and commentary in Bolton and Katok (1998) emphasizes the difficulty in finding 
comparable field negotiations.3 
3m fact, Fiegenbaum (1975) notes that the statute in Michigan makes FOA function more like med-arb, 
where the arbitrator fmds himself mediating to some extent as parties alter their fmal offers. Given that dispute rates 
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Mock negotiations experiments can ensure that the dispute resolution procedures are, in 
fact, similar. Such efforts have also shown dispute rates to be higher in CA compared to FOA 
(Neale and Bazerman, 1983; Grigsby and Bigoness, 1982; Notz and Starke, 1978). Though rich 
in context and similarity to simple field negotiations, such mock negotiation simulations fail to 
control the arbitrator decision-making process, which may introduce confounding effects into the 
data. Ashenfelter et al. (1992) models preferred arbitrator settlements as a density function to 
mechanize the arbitrator decision-making process and find higher dispute rates in FOA 
compared to CA. More recent experimental evidence in Dickinson (in press) also find higher 
dispute rates in FOA, and so more recent laboratory data is at odds with previous findings. 4 
A separate line of research has examined the role of divergent expectations as a cause of 
dispute. Farber and Bazerman (1989) note that it is a " ... prominent explanation for 
disagreement in bargaining ... " (p.99). Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) discuss what they call a 
"self-serving bias" as a cause of bargaining impasse, and they note the body of evidence in 
support of this rather widespread existence of this phenomenon. Further empirical evidence is 
found in Neale and Bazerman (1985), Loewenstein et al. (1993), Babcock et al. (1995), and 
Farmer at al. (2001), which all highlight the role that optimism can play in disputes. The data 
here seem quite consistent and in line with theoretical models of how optimism can cause 
bargaining failure (e.g., see Shavell, 1982; Priest and Klein, 1984). 
It is clear that optimism contributes to bargaining failure and, therefore, higher dispute 
rates. What this present article contributes is a systematic examination of the effects of disputant 
are uniformly higher when mediation is used it is perhaps not surprising that FOA generates such low dispute rates 
in this context (see also Rehmus, 1974). 
40ther experimental research has included a mechanized arbitrator to resolve disputes in bargaining but 
these studies do not focus on comparing outcomes across different arbitration institutions (e.g., Chamess, 2000; 
Pecorino and Van Boening, 2001; Bolton and Katok, 1998) 
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expectations and optimism across distinct laboratory-controlled arbitration mechanisms. While 
Babcock et al. (1995) argue that a context-rich experiment, such as their case study experiment, 
is more likely to allow optimism to manifest itself, we find evidence of optimism even in the 
neutral-context lab experiments studied herein. As such, one could consider the present results 
as a conservative measure of the likely chilling effect of optimism on bargaining. There is also 
presently no evidence in experimental economics on the effects of optimism in a setting that 
controls the arbitrator decision process. Finally, there is little if any evidence on bargaining 
outcomes using innovative arbitration procedures, such as CombA, and the laboratory is a 
natural place to dry-run a new institution like CombA at low cost (see, e.g., Smith, 1982). 
Dickinson (in press) is the only empirical study of bargaining outcomes under CombA, and his 
results suggest that optimism may be an important determinant of the dispute rate differences 
across arbitration institutions that he reports. This article contributes by measuring the effects of 
optimism across an innovative and both commonly used arbitration procedures. 
3. The "Chilling Effect" Hypotheses 
Our expectations-effect hypotheses examine both dispute rates and final-offer divergence 
of the disputants. Weare clear to identify these separate effects of optimism though the 
literature seems to interchangeably speak of higher dispute or more divergent final offers as 
equivalent manifestations of the chilling effect in bargaining. 
In examining dispute rates, consider that a disputant's expected utility of impasse or 
co 
dispute is given by fh(x)g(x) dx, where hex) represent the disputant's beliefs about likely 
-co 
outcomes in the event of a dispute and g(x) describes a well-behaved payoff function. Here, we 
consider that utility is increasing in x, and so this would be appropriate for analysis of our 
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bargainer B, the seller, expected payoffs. This expected utility framework is motivated by 
Farber and Katz (1979). In CA, h(x)=f{x), which is just the arbitrator settlement distribution, but 
in FOA or CombA, hex) is a function ofbothf{x) and the arbitration rules that utilize final offer 
information (e.g., in FOA hex) is a bimodal distribution with all of its mass at final offers Xa and 
Xb). Given this framework, optimism is simple to analyze in the sense that it reflects a more 
favorable hex) distribution. This could imply an optimistic location is the distributions mean, or 
a self-serving perceived skewness in the shape of hex). Either way, it implies a higher expected 
payoff in the event of dispute when beliefs about the uncertain outcomes possibilities of impasse 
are optimistic, ceteris paribus. Disputes are just an alternative way of achieving an outcome 
compared to voluntary settlement, and so a decline in the relative cost or price of a disputed 
outcome follows from optimism. This decline in relative price of dispute would increase the 
demand for disputed or arbitrated outcomes when one views disputes as a "good" as in this 
framework. Therefore, we have: 
Chilling Hypothesis #1: Optimism will increase dispute rates across all arbitration 
procedures. 
The other dimension of optimism's potential chilling effect lies in its potential to increase 
the divergence between disputants' final offers or final bargaining positions. When viewed as 
distinct from the dispute rate hypothesis it may seem a trivial concern, but [mal offers can be 
viewed as an indicator of how close the parties are too agreement. Additionally, since FOA and 
in some cases CombA constrain the arbitrator to select one of the final offers, more divergent 
[mal offers implies more extreme and potentially less acceptable arbitrated awards. 
One can establish in each of the three arbitration institutions examined that optimism 
implies more divergent [mal offers than unbiased expectations. In CombA, expectations can 
even be optimistic to a degree while still preserving the convergence property of the procedure. 
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However, Brams and Merrill (1986) show that final offers will eventually diverge in CombA if 
expectations are optimistic enough. In FOA, Dickinson (2003) shows that optimism will cause 
final offers to diverge under both a naIve and a more sophisticated version of disputant beliefs. 
Finally, in CA, the framework of Farber (1981) shows that, if final offers are considered by the 
arbitrator in the final arbitrated settlement decision, then equilibrium final offers are a function 
of, among other things, the mean expected value of the arbitrator settlement distribution. As 
such, one can show that optimism implies more divergent fmal offers in CA as well (see Farber's 
Nash equations (15) and (16) on p.75 of his article). One difference to be noted, however, is that 
final offers do not influence the arbitrator in the computerized version of CA. As such, it is less 
clear whether or not optimism would be predicted to cause more divergent final offers in our 
experimental CA, where final offers do not have strategic value in the arbitration institution. 
Though CA arbitrators in practice are certainly influenced by the facts of the case, which likely 
influence final offers, Ashenfelter (1987) and Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) used field data to 
show that it is reasonable to model CA decisions as draws from an unbiased settlement 
distribution. The unintended side-effect of a computerized CA arbitrator who ignores final offers 
is that our data can also be used to examine the extent to which optimism's predicted final-offer 
divergence effect is a function of the strategic nature of final offers in the arbitration institution. 
Our second hypothesis is then, 
Chilling Hypothesis #2: When disputes occur, optimism will increase fmal offer divergence 
when final offers are strategic to the arbitration institution (FOA 
and CombA in the experiments). 
4. Experimental Environment 
The bargaining environment is described in more detail in Dickinson (in press). Subjects 
are randomly and anonymously matched to another subject for a 20-round bargaining 
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experiment. The experiment is context-free, and payoff tables for the object of negotiation-an 
abstract variable, x-are used to induce win-loss payoff functions on the subjects in their 
negotiations. Bargainer A (B) earns more cash in each round of the experiment for lower 
(higher) values of x, and offers are made by submitting proposed values of x on the computer 
terminal-this is the only communication allowed in the experiment. If subj ects have not agreed 
upon a value of x within the 2-minute time limit of the round, one of 4 dispute resolution 
procedures is utilized to determine the outcome for the round after final offers are elicited (and 
assuming that the final offers do not converge, in which case agreement is automatic): no 
arbitration (NA), CA, FOA, or CombA. In NA, impasse is handled by giving both subjects a 
zero payoff. In the arbitration treatments, all subjects bargain for 5-rounds under each dispute 
resolution treatment. This is a within-subjects design that can more easily identify causal 
relationships in the arbitration treatments. 
The computerized arbitrator is a Normal (500,60) random number distribution from 
which a number is drawn at bargaining impasse in any round of the CA, FOA, and CombA 
treatments. As such, the arbitrator's preferred settlement distribution is completely controlled 
across arbitration institutions. Payoffs are such that x=500 splits a $2.00 pie for both subjects, 
but bargaining ranges are suggested to limit mechanical split-the-pie differences somewhat.5 
Bargainers are always given the opportunity to submit a final offer once the round has ended in 
impasse. Assuming that the disputants still do not agree based on converged or criss-crossed 
final offers (i.e., buyer final offer, xa, greater than seller final offer, Xb), then the dispute 
resolution procedure of that treatment is invoked to settle the round. In NA, both subjects 
receive a zero payoff, and in CA the draw from the computerf{x) distribution is the settlement 
5Specifically, bargainer A is suggested to negotiate for values of x between 200 and 700, while bargainer B 
is suggested to negotiate x between 300 and 800. 
for that round. In FOA and CombA, the disputants' final offers are used along with the draw 
fromj(x) to determine the binding settlement based on the rules of each procedure. Whenever 
FOA rules are used, the final offer closest to z is chosen as the settlement. 
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Expectations elicitation occurs at the beginning of all CA, FOA, and CombA rounds. As 
such, a point estimate of the subject's expectation of the average value drawn fromj(z) is 
recorded whether or not arbitration is invoked by that subject-pair for that round. Subjects will 
form their expectations about the computerized arbitrator from the information on the 
computerized arbitrator in the experimental instructions. Three related protocols, called Low 
Info, Medium Info, and High Info, are used across different experimental bargaining pairs. In 
Low Info, subjects are shown a table of 100 draws from the samef{x) used in their experimental 
arbitration treatments. This protocol is used in Ashenfelter et al. (1992), among others, as a 
method considered most parallel with how real-world disputants would gather information from 
the field to form expectations. As we will see, this protocol is also the most likely to allow 
subjects to form biased expectations of arbitrator preferences. In Medium Info, subjects are 
shown the table of 100 draws, and in addition they are given a picture of the normal density 
function used, along with summary statistics that includes the mean of the distribution. In High 
Info, subjects are shown the table, the graph, and read aloud a brief prepared written statement by 
the experimenter about how subj ects do not always form accurate expectations when uncertainty 
is involved (though the direction of the bias was not mentioned). 
A monetary incentive was provided to help generate subjects' true expectations. Subjects 
were informed that they would be paid an additional $2 on top of other experimental earnings for 
an expectation within ten x-units above or below the true averagej(x)-value. They were also 
informed that one of their expectations would be drawn randomly at the end of the experiment to 
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determine their qualification for the extra expectation incentive. Though not a large monetary 
incentive, the data shown later in this article indicate that these point estimates of expectations 
increase in accuracy in the higher information protocols. This is what one would expect if the 
expectations data from this experimental procedure are a reasonable proxy for subjects' true 
expectations. 6 
5. Results 
Experiments were conducted on a total of 126 bargaining pairs (i.e., 252 total subjects). 
Subjects were primarily undergraduate students and payoffs averaged about $20 for a 1.5 hour 
experiment, which is a considerably higher hourly wage rate than jobs on campus. Each of the 
three distinct arbitrator information protocols were use on approximately equal numbers of 
bargaining pairs (45, 41, and 40 pairs for the Low, Medium, and High Info protocols, 
respectively). Figure 1 shows the frequency of subject expectations in each of the three 
information protocols for buyers and sellers separately. Two items are apparent from Figure 1. 
First, subjects were optimistic on average (see also Table 1). This is evidenced by the fact that 
expectations of the mean ofj(x) tend to be lower (higher) than the true mean for buyers (sellers). 
Each side of the bargaining table expects relatively more favorable settlement draws from the 
arbitrator than will actually occur on average. 
The second item to note is that the Medium and High Info protocols were only partially 
effective at de-biasing the subjects. This does not pose any problem for the ex post data analysis 
since expectations can be more fully controlled in the econometric analysis, but it does indicate 
that optimism is not easily removed. Recall that in both Medium and High Info subjects are 
6 Additionally, the fact that only one random round is selected for compensation for accurate expectations 
makes it unlikely that any subject would creatively use this to diversify payoff risk (e.g., submit a low expectation 
but then a high [mal offer). The data show that expectations and [mal offers are positively not negatively correlated. 
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actually given the exact value of the mean ofj{x), and yet only about 50% of the subjects in High 
Info had unbiased expectations. One possible explanation is that some subjects did not 
understand the information given on the computerized arbitrator, but others have found similar 
difficulty in attempting to de-bias optimistic subjects (e.g., Babcock et aI., 1997; Fischhoff, 
1977). As such, it seems likely that some subjects are simply not easily swayed in their beliefs, 
which presents a challenge in attempting to convey an accurate assessment of likely impasse 
outcomes to individuals in naturally occurring bargaining contexts.7 
Additional summary statistics are shown in Table 1. As with Figure 1, optimism is 
apparent for the average experimental subj ect. The dispute rate summary statistics are somewhat 
less clear in their interpretation from Table 1. It is clear that arbitration of any sort increases 
dispute rates over the NA treatment where zero payoffs follow impasse. What is less clear is 
how expectations interact with the distinct arbitration institutions. More precise information, as 
is given in Medium and High Info seems to lower dispute rates in CA and CombA, but it actually 
increases them in FOA. Given that optimism still exists even in High Info, we tum to an 
econometric analysis that explicitly controls for the expectations of a given bargaining pair in a 
given round as best approach for uncovering the effects of expectations on dispute rates. 
Table 2 shows results from the empirical estimation equations that shed light on the 
chilling effect hypotheses. Optimism is measured here as pairwise optimism, or seller 
expectations minus buyer expectations at the beginning of the bargaining round. Pairwise 
optimism (pessimism) exists when seller expectations are greater (less) than buyer expectations. 
7Representatives, such as lawyers, may playa key role here in their ability to more objectively assess 
outcome probabilities and advise clients. Lawyers are, of course, potentially subject to the self-serving bias as well 
(Babcock et al. (1993), but likely to a lesser degree in terms of their client's trial outcome given that the objective 
function of the lawyer mayor may not be similar to that of the client. Evidence from the experiments also shows 
that optimism persists over time. Optimism seems just as likely in later experimental rounds as in earlier ones. 
These results are available upon request. 
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Though this approach of measuring expectations is appropriate given that this sort of divergence 
in expectations is what drives the chilling effect, this approach makes it possible to have two 
pessimistic expectations that are labeled as pairwise optimism (e.g., if seller expectation=480 and 
buyer expectation=460). This occurs in a minority of the cases, however, as average 
expectations at the individual level are optimistic (Figure 1 and Table 1). 
The first column estimates the probability of dispute as a function of the arbitration 
treatment effects (NA is the omitted reference treatment), pairwise expectations in each 
arbitration treatment (Exp interacted with each arbitration treatment), and the information 
protocol used in the experiment (Low Info is the reference protocol). So, HiInfo * FDA gives the 
incremental effect of High Info on dispute rates in FOA compared to the Low Info protocol, 
which is given by the marginal effect reported on FDA at the top of the column. The model 
correctly predicts 66% of the outcomes in the 2520 total subject pair rounds. Random effects are 
used to model the heterogeneity in disputes rates across subject pairs and the possible non-
independence in observations within a SUbject-pair but across bargaining rounds. 
The main results are in support of the Chilling Hypothesis #1. The marginal effects of 
the random effects probit estimation are shown and pairwise optimism is estimated to 
significantly increase dispute rates in each arbitration treatment. This is consistent with existing 
research examining the self-serving bias or optimism in other contexts (Loewenstein et aI., 1993; 
Neale and Bazerman, 1985). The magnitude of the marginal effects is such that a divergence in 
expectations of 100 x-units-about 1 2/3 standard deviations of the actual computerj{x) 
distribution-increases dispute rate by 8-9%, depending on the arbitration treatment. The effect 
of optimism on dispute rates appears to be quite uniform across arbitration treatment. What is 
less clear is how subjects respond to the different information protocols. The High Info protocol 
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significantly increases dispute rates by 15.5% in FOA, whereas the Medium Info protocol 
decreases dispute rates by 11 % in CombA. These are estimated pure protocol effects that are 
distinct from the chilling effect estimates of optimism on dispute rates. It is not clear why the 
different information protocol would affect subjects differently across arbitration institutions, but 
these different protocols are not likely to apply in practice, thus highlighting the need to separate 
their effects from the incentive effects of optimism itself. 
Once the effects of expectations are measured, the residual effects of the arbitration 
treatments themselves are shown in the marginal effects estimates of CA, FOA, and CombA. 
The use of arbitration significantly increases the probability of dispute compared to the NA 
treatment, not surprisingly. What is perhaps more interesting is that the use of CombA is 
predicted to marginally increase dispute rates above NA by the highest amount among the 
arbitration treatments considered (greater than CA (p=.04) and FOA (p=.OO) using the chi-
squared test). The marginal increase in dispute rates is statistically no different in CA and FOA 
(p=.23 for the chi-squared test). This is evidence at odds with the idea that CombA might 
produce lower dispute rates, ceteris paribus, given its final offer convergence predictions. More 
on this will be said in the next section. 
The second column of Table 2 examines the effects of divergent expectations on fmal-
offer differences (Chilling Hypothesis #2). The results of a random effect model are shown for 
the subset of the pooled data where a dispute resolution procedure is invoked (N=1228). Though 
the treatment effects, expectations variables, and information protocol variables do not explain 
much of the variation in the final-offer differences (adjusted R2=.10), the significance of the 
coefficients on the expectations variables is of interest. Firstly, final offers are significantly more 
divergent in the Low Info protocol under CA than in NA, FOA, or CombA, ceteris paribus. The 
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higher information protocols mitigate this effect for CA. In terms of evaluating the Chilling 
Hypothesis #2, the coefficients on Exp *CA, Exp * FDA, and Exp *CombA indicate that optimism 
increases the divergence of final offers. Also given that optimism's effects are largest in FOA 
and smallest (insignificantly different from zero) in CA, this is evidence that the chilling effect of 
optimism on final-offer divergence is a function of the degree to which final offers playa 
strategic role in the arbitration institution. While final offers are strategic in both FOA and 
CombA, they are somewhat less so in CombA given that CA rules are used for CombA when the 
arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement lies outside the disputants' final offers. As such, there are 
combinations of fmal offers and expected arbitrator settlement preferences for which the final 
offers will not constrain the arbitrated settlement. 
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the chilling effect predictions on CA, FOA, 
and CombA as implied by the estimated coefficients in Table 2 for the more externally valid Low 
Info protocol. The forecast values of the final-offer difference are shown over the range of 
expectations differences from -100 (pairwise pessimism) to 400 (extreme pairwise optimism), 
which is the range containing over 98% of the experimental data. What figure 2 highlights is 
that, at least for the range of data containing average levels of optimism, CombA is estimated to 
produce the most convergent final offers. What is different from the theoretical predictions of 
CombA is that not only are final offers not completely convergent, but the relatively greater 
convergence in CombA relative to CA and FOA is only statistically significant for optimistic 
disputants-the theoretical convengence results for CombA are for unbiased disputants (Brams 
and Merrill, 1986). It is a more important finding, however, that the estimated chilling effect on 
final offers seems dependent on the importance on the final offers themselves in the arbitration 
institution, especially if disputants tend to be optimistically biased in naturally occurring 
bargaining situations that utilize formal dispute resolution procedures. 
6. Discussion 
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This research seeks to gain a greater understanding of how disputant optimism manifests 
itself in bargaining outcomes that utilize arbitration. The controlled laboratory environment 
allows precise measurement of disputants' expectations of arbitrated settlement possibilities, and 
it also guarantees comparability across arbitration institutions. Outcomes in both commonly 
used forms of arbitration as well as an innovative procedure called "Combined Arbitration" are 
examined within the context of optimism. The theoretical properties of CombA seem more 
attractive than those for CA or FOA, and so a laboratory analysis of this institution is a logical 
way to generate initial data on the procedure. 
As has been shown in existing research, disputants tend to be optimistic and the optimism 
is not easily removed. One cannot claim that this optimism is an artifact of the student-subject 
pool that generated this data because others have uncovered similar optimistic beliefs even 
among experienced adult negotiators (Babcock et aI., 1993; Babcock et aI., 1996). The 
importance of optimism is in its ability to introduce inefficiencies on multiple dimensions-both 
higher dispute rates and more divergent [mal offers result from optimism. Dispute rates rise with 
the optimism of the bargaining pair across all arbitration institutions studied, and so if self-
determined outcomes are considered desirable then there is a significant public interest in 
mitigating optimism. As noted in Babcock et aI. (1997), certain procedures deemed reasonably 
successful at mitigating optimism in practice, such as forcing disputants to think about the 
weaknesses in their own bargaining positions, could be easily integrated into existing alternative 
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dispute resolution procedures to increase voluntary settlement rates.8 It is also possible that the 
use of more objective representatives and/or lawyers may help de-bias the disputants. Though 
such individuals are also subject to a self-serving bias (Babcock et aI., 1995), they are likely not 
as affected as the disputants themselves. An interesting implication is that legal representation, 
though contributing to the formality and cost of arbitration hearings, may offset these higher 
costs in terms of improving disputant expectations, which could improve outcomes for both 
disputants. 
Final offers are also found more divergent for those institutions that utilize final offers 
explicitly in their settlement rules. This is the case for both FOA and CombA, but not CA, in our 
experiments. The commonly used FOA procedure constrains the arbitrator to choose one of the 
final offers as the binding settlement, but we find evidence that such rules interact in a way that 
worsens the effects of optimism. Specifically, optimistic disputants submit more divergent final 
offers (i.e., final bargaining positions) than unbiased disputants. This may seem trivial since 
impasse results whether final offers diverge little or much. When one realizes that these final 
offers determine the arbitrated settlement possibilities, then more divergent fmal offers imply a 
greater variance in arbitrated settlements. Others have argued how FOA may produce less 
desirable or equitable outcomes given the all-or-nothing nature of the settlements it generates 
(Feigenbaum, 1975), and so optimism would make the FOA institution even less acceptable. 
Acceptability of FOA outcomes are likely quite important in practice as some state jurisdictions' 
have chosen to use FOA rules that allow the arbitrator to select among disputant final offers 
issue-by-issue for labor contract disputes. Though such issue-by-issue FOA rules may increase 
FOA's acceptability, the trade-off is that FOA is no longer the same FOA institution envisioned 
8While such a procedure has been found successful in role-playing experiments, a similar procedure was 
not possible in this article's abstract bargaining experiments. 
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by Stevens (1966) to reduce arbitration's chilling effect. Absent a concerted effort to mitigate 
disputant optimism, such compromise rules for FOA may be a second-best solution, though FOA 
then becomes transformed into a more CA-like institution. 
Once the effects of optimism are removed from the data, the prediction is that dispute 
rates will be highest in CombA (see also Dickinson, in press) and statistical similar dispute rates 
in CA and FOA. It appears that the higher dispute rates in FOA versus CA in Ashenfelter et al. 
(1992) and Dickinson (in press) may be the result of optimism. Since optimism is also present in 
naturally occurring negotiations where FOA often generates lower dispute rates, there are clearly 
other factors to be considered in identifying the determinants of dispute rate differences in CA 
and FOA found in field data, such as historical practices, type of dispute settle by arbitration, or 
procedural differences within CA and/or FOA institutions. 
Though the theoretical predictions ofBrams and Merrill (1986) examine disputant final 
offers, the authors view is that this will decrease dispute rates, and this is inconsistent with the 
observed higher dispute rates in CombA. Two alternative sources of impasse are possible: 
asymmetric information and risk preferences. The experimental environment provided identical 
information on the arbitration settlement distribution to bargainers A and B. Private payoff 
tables and suggested bargaining ranges are a source of asymmetric information, but this source 
was identical across dispute resolution procedures. It therefore seems unlikely that asymmetric 
information is the cause of higher dispute rates in CombA relative to CA or FOA. 
Risk preferences are another potential source of impasse. Though a trustworthy measure 
of subject risk preferences is not generated in these experiments, Holt and Laury (2002) report 
data from typical student-subject pools indicating that such subjects are, on average, risk averse. 
Unfortunately, this may raise more questions than it answers because Dickinson (in press) argues 
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that risk aversion would imply lower dispute rates in CombA. Higher dispute rates in CombA 
would be consistent with risk loving behavior, but there is no supporting evidence that this is 
driving the dispute rate results. One possibility, yet to be explored, is that disputants A and B 
frame the bargaining environment differently. Babcock et al. (1995) find evidence in that trial 
lawyers as well as student subj ects may frame settlement outcomes as a gain or loss when 
assigned to a plaintiff or defendant role, respectively. Since our subjects negotiate over the value 
of x, it is possible that disputants A frame this decision task as a "loss" given that higher values 
ofx imply lower payoffs to disputant A. The prospect theory work of Kahn em an and Tversky 
(1979) may then imply that disputants A will behave in a risk-loving manner, while disputants B 
would behave in a risk-averse manner. This is pure speculation for the present paper, but it 
offers one potentially fruitful avenue for further exploration of the cause of higher dispute rates 
inCombA. 
It seems clear that there are incentive effects of distinct dispute resolution institutions that 
have not been fully identified. Nevertheless, there is a strong and consistent message in the 
optimism results from the data. In fact, the optimism results seem to strengthen the argument 
that dispute resolution can be significantly improved within existing dispute resolution 
institutions by addressing the issue of divergent expectations. Efforts can be expended to 
improve the structure and settlement incentives of arbitration institutions themselves, but there 
does not seem a consistency of evidence indicating that certain arbitration rules are better than 
others. Improving the accuracy of disputant expectations offers an avenue for predictably 
improving outcomes across a variety of procedures and is likely a key to limiting inefficiencies 
in dispute resolution institutions. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Expectations and Dispute Rates 
Low Information Medium Information High Information 
Protocol Protocol Protocol 
Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller 
Pooled Expectations 468.5 525.6 477.8 520.9 484.4 515.9 
data Dispute rate 52% 47% 57% 
NA Expectations 
treatment Dispute rate 20% 16% 14.5% 
CA Expectations 468.0 523.7 484.4 522.0 486.9 515.9 
treatment Dispute rate 63% 58% 57% 
FOA Expectations 467.8 525.5 473.8 521.7 478.2 517.6 
treatment Dispute rate 57% 60% 67% 
CombA Expectations 469.6 527.6 475.1 518.9 488.1 515.5 
treatment Dispute rate 69% 54% 57% 
Computerized Arbitrator -- Normal (1:!=500,cr=60) 
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Table 2: Empirical Estimations 
Dependent variable=Final Offer 
Dependent variable =Dispute difference 
(Random Effects Probit Model) (Random Effects Model) 
Variable Marginal Effect (p-value) Coefficient (p-value) 
Constant -.38 (.00)*** 80.41 (.00)*** 
CA .42 (.00)*** 62.69 (.00)*** 
FOA .38 (.00)*** 17.65(.18) 
CombA .50 (.00)*** 6.04 (.64) 
Exp*CA .0009 (.00)*** .077(.16) 
Exp*FOA .0008 (.01)*** .36 (.00)*** 
Exp*CombA .0008 (.00)*** .23 (.00)*** 
MedInfo*CA .009 (.88) -.39.80 (.01)*** 
HiInfo*CA .014 (.81) -53.91 (.00)*** 
MedInfo*FOA .069 (.28) 16.61 (.26) 
HiInfo*FOA .155 (.00)*** -3.25 (.82) 
MedInfo*CombA -.114 (.05)** 22.25 (.13) 
HiInfo*CombA -.066 (.25) -9.80 (.50) 
N=2520 N=1238 
Log Likelihood function 
= -1402.188 R2=.10 
*,**,*** show significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the two-tailed test. 
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